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Abstract 
Ever since the onset of the recent crisis, monetary business cycle theories have started to regain their relevance and timeliness in 
explaining business fluctuations. According to these theories, it is monetary mismanagement that lies at the bottom of 
macroeconomic dysfunctions in the intertemporal allocation of resources. This paper presents the main theoretical implications of 
monetary business cycle models, regarding the causes of the cycle and the appropriate policies required to overcome recessions. 
In addition, we investigate whether, at the policy level, macroeconomists are indeed addressing the causes of the business cycle, 
in order to provide feasible solutions to end recessions. 
Keywords: Monetary business cycles, monetary policy, intertemporal disequilibrium, market-clearing model; 
1. Introduction 
The recent global crisis has once again questi
and to provide policy solutions to economic crises. Considerable theoretical progress has been made within the main 
research paradigms; on the whole, the New Classical economists analyze the business cycle within the market-
clearing model, while the New Keynesians attribute business fluctuations to various market failures and the Austrian 
economists analyze the cycle in terms of intertemporal disequilibrium. We pay particular attention to monetary 
business cycles, and we investigate whether they do account for the cyclical behaviour observed in the economy. 
The first section of this paper presents two models of monetary business cycles in terms of business cycle 
mechanisms, and their policy implications. The second section brings empirical evidence to support the theoretical 
conclusions regarding the causes of the cycle and the policy measures to stop recessions.  
2. Monetary business cycle models  some theoretical insights 
Monetary business cycle theories regard monetary mismanagement as the origin of macroeconomic dysfunctions 
in the intertemporal allocation of resources, by focusing on the relative-price effects of a monetary disturbance, 
instead of focusing on macroeconomic aggregates, which actually conceal relative-price effects. Early monetary 
models of the business cycle originated from Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises and were further developed 
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rigorously by Friedrich von Hayek. According to Mises, an artificially low interest rate leads to credit expansion 
which brings about booming business, since the policy of cheap money makes some unprofitable investment 
projects appear attractive to entrepreneurs. As credit expands in the economy, prices begin to rise, and entrepreneurs 
find themselves short of funds to sustain the investment projects they initiated. However, as credit continues 
expanding, investors find no need to worry, since they borrow more to continue their activities. Eventually, the 
unsustainable investments are corrected during the recession, when credit contraction occurs. 
 
Through a policy of easy money, public authorities expose economic agents to the perception of profitable 
investments and diminishing risk. While, in the short run these policies may stimulate economic activity, they 
determine malinvestment in the economy over the long run. Credit growth sets the ground for over-investment and 
consumption patterns that are inconsistent with individual time preferences and the availability of specific resources. 
In this context, Hayek claimed that monetary injections can have a systematic effect on the intertemporal behaviour 
of prices, leading to intertemporal discoordination. The theoretical construct was based on a particular view of the 
economy's time-consuming production process, where the features of the "structure of production" correspond to the 
dimensions of a right triangle. The base of the triangle represents the time dimension of the production structure, the 
degree of roundaboutness; the other leg represents the money value of the consumer goods generated in the 
production process. Slices of the triangle perpendicular to the time leg represent stages of production; the height of 
individual slices represents the money value of the unfinished production process. The prosperity which precedes a 
recession is marked by a lowering of the nominal interest rate below its market level, in the absence of monetary 
expansion. While the interest rate is artificially low during the expansion, firms invest largely in physical capital. 
Since the interest rate is so low, the production process can take more time to produce the same amount of real 
output, so the base of the triangle becomes longer, and the slope of the hypotenuse becomes flatter.  
 
Hayek makes a clear distinction between interest-rate changes incurred by changes in the intertemporal 
preferences of consumers and interest-rate changes incurred by monetary policy. In the first instance, changes in the 
pattern of prices allow the structure of production to be modified in accordance with the changed consumer 
preferences; in the second instance, changes in the pattern of prices represent "false signals," which lead to a 
misallocation of resources among the stages of production. The artificially low rate of interest will determine an 
unsustainable boom in which excess resources are committed to the early stages of production. More production 
projects are initiated than can be completed and subsequent resource scarcities turn the artificial boom into a bust. 
Economic recovery cannot occur unless the "malinvestments" are terminated and resources are reallocated according 
to actual intertemporal preferences and resource availabilities. At the same time, however, the lower interest rate 
means consumers increase their consumption and decrease saving. The effect is an economy where real consumable 
output takes longer to produce, while consumers are less willing to wait for their needs to be satisfied. This 
production structure is unsustainable, and eventually will result in the abandonment of many entrepreneurial plans, 
of much installed capital and of goods in early production stages, as well as in high unemployment
nd a longer 
production structure. The money supply expansion induced by policy is apparently fully justified by an increase in 
investments and economic activity as a whole; however, the bust becomes inevitable: firstly, because the production 
structure is 
early-stage output into the same amount of late-stage final output. Hayek acknowledged that expectations about 
future interest rate changes and interpretations of intertemporal price movements can have an important effect on the 
trade cycle, in other words, that prices are signals. But he did not assume, as contemporary economists do, that 
falsified price signals accompanied by rational expectations signify unfalsified price signals. Such equivalence 
would require that market participants make use of certain information that they are unlikely to possess; it would 
require that they have knowledge of the "real" factors independent of the price system that allegedly communicates 
that knowledge.  
 
Another important type of monetary business cycle is that constructed by the New Classical economists, 
particularly Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1972), who tries to elucidate how shifts in monetary policy influence inflation, 
theory relies on the premise that individuals are more informed about the 
prices of the goods they produce than the price of the goods they acquire. Consequently, they tend to mistake 
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movements in the general price level  which are irrelevant in the model  for movements in the relative prices  
which are relevant. In the case of unanticipated inflation, individuals infer that the relative prices of the goods they 
produce are temporarily high, and thus decide to increase output. Lucas constructs his model within a framework 
initially developed by Paul Samuelson (1958)  where we find two generations of people, young and old, and only 
one commodity, which cannot be stored. In this model, young generations must find a way to transfer part of each 
introduces money in his model: the old 
pay the money they possess in exchange for the goods they consume; the young, on the other hand, are willing to 
sell part of their production, with a view to buying goods when they are old. The main feature of this market-
clearing model is that money is neutral. An injection of money in the economy incurs a rise in prices, which can 
have 2 explanations: (i) prices may be high due to monetary perturbations, in which case the optimal decision is to 
maintain current output levels or (ii) prices may be high due to the low number of producers, in which case the 
optimal decision is to increase output. If the producers do not know for sure, then the best decision is a trade-off 
between the 2 extremes, but production rises on the whole. If the extent of the monetary perturbation is known, there 
are no reasons for confusion about the origin of the price increase and monetary perturbations are neutral. In other 
words, the model implies a clear distinction between anticipated monetary fluctuations  which are neutral  and 
unanticipated monetary fluctuations  which do influence real variables. In constructing his model, Lucas somewhat 
departs from the Walrasian paradigm, by assuming imperfect information about prices. This type of models 
generated a lot of interest in the `70s, but it has attracted very few supporters recently: its opponents claim that the 
confusions about the price level cannot generate such large shifts in output and employment. Moreover, empirical 
evidence generally invalidated monetary models, and their policy prescriptions are opposed to the current 
mainstream view. as an important consequence at the policy level: the 
best monetary policy rule is to fix an annual constant growth rate for money supply; this is to be accompanied by a 
series of fiscal rules, but they are necessarily minimal rules. 
 
els have several similarities in common. In both theory, the business cycle is caused by 
The two economists however, have different goals: Hayek focuses 
on the inconsistency of the numerous individual plans of producers, while Lucas attempts to make predictions about 
the behaviour of the representative individual agent. On the whole, the description of the business cycle corresponds 
to both theories, by focusing on agents which may be monetary, real, or both. The 
Austrians take into consideration the price of credit, while the New Classicals analyze the price of goods, but the 
common point is that economic agents are not able to discern easily the real from the monetary component in the 
overall change. In both theories, the way economic agents will react depends on the origin of the price change: if 
this change reflects a change in economic circumstances, then an adjustment of real variables is required; if, on the 
contrary, it results from monetary perturbations, then such an adjustment is harmful. In this way, both schools admit 
the existence of significant non-neutrality during the adjustment to the increased money supply. 
 
One important difference between the two theories relates to the specific business cycle mechanism; simply put, 
according to Lucas
the nominal prices of goods. In the Austrian approach, agents are determined to start an unsustainable amount of 
investments in response to the low interest rate. Once they learn the true nature of the price increase, agents either 
return to the initial level of employment, or they liquidate the excess malinvestments. Moreover, the two theories 
differ in the specific way they approach the concept of equilibrium. The New Classicals demonstrate that the 
cyclical evolution of the macroeconomic variables is consistent with the general equilibrium framework all 
throughout the business cycle. The Austrian model, on the other hand, assumes that the business cycle is precisely a 
form of systematic intertemporal disequilibrium.  
3. Business cycle causality and stabilization policies  some empirical evidence 
The policy prescriptions of monetary theories are very clear: (i) never interfere with the market interest rate or the 
money supply, and thus create credit expansion or inflation, and (ii) during recessions
actions to liquidate unsustainable investment. So long as policy makers believe the business cycle can be alleviated 
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In what regards business cycle mechanisms, the Austrian theory provides unique and persuasive qualitative 
explanations 
efforts to liquidate inefficient capital, which led to a lengthy secondary contraction. Valuable resources were wasted 
in unproductive investments in artificially expanded industries. Rothbard shows that inflation and credit expansion 
continued, preventing any liquidation of malinvested capital. This view however, contrasts strongly with Friedman 
action was caused by 
policy and subsequent failure to provide enough liquidity. Robert F. Mulligan (2006), also tests the monetary 
models: the author shows that credit expansion leads to an unsustainable short-run increase in total output, 
consumption and investment, but a long-run decrease in all three, leading to recessions. Sometimes, as during the 
Great Depression an
the malinvestments, thus prolonging the contraction. Moreover, recent empirical studies point out that in many 
European countries, the current global crisis was also triggered by artificially low interest rates and credit expansion 
 either investment credit, or consumer credit. In Austrian business cycle theory, recessions can start in three ways: 
(1) Deflation: often, following an expansion of money supply, monetary authorities recognize the dangers of low 
interest rates and tighten the money supply. Such policy can be observed before the Great Depression, the Volker 
recession of 1981 82, and the 2001 recession of the US economy; (2) Steady inflation: central banks continue to 
increase the money supply at approximately the same rate as during the expansion. This happens when monetary 
authorities are unaware of the effects of excessive credit; most post-war recessions start in this way, including the 
first Gulf crisis recession (1990 91); (3) Accelerating inflation: the monetary authorities may foresee the recession, 
or perceive the increased demand for credit, and attempt to prevent the collapse by increasing the money supply 
even faster. The recession is postponed as long as credit growth can accommodate the high demand for both 
consumption and investment goods. This was the case with the oil-shock recessions of 1969 70 and 1973 74. 
 
count of the stagflation of the 
resources. Misallocated capital has a constant negative effect on consumable output because it cannot be easily 
reallocated. Credit expansion always increases consumption expenditures because the new money means increased 
nominal income to some households. Wainhouse (1984) presents one of the first econometric studies of ABC 
theory. Hughes (1997) and Cwik (1998) apply ABC theory to the first Gulf War recession. Using monetary models, 
Garrison (2001) also provides convincing arguments regarding the Great Depression and the stagflation of the 
1970s. Carilli and Dempster (2001) argue that Austrian business cycle theory focu
credit expansion as a real increase in available funds. They suggest that even if rational agents anticipate inflation 
correctly, agents maximize profits under uncertainty by taking advantage of the market interest rate whenever it falls 
below the market rate. Keeler (2001) uses data for eight U.S. business cycles, and concludes that money supply 
increases did trigger business cycles, which were propagated through relative price changes, including nominal 
interest rates. Powe the expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policy, which Finally, using sectoral labour data, 
Mulligan (2002) finds that resources are reallocated among early, middle, and late stages of production in response 
to changes in nominal interest rates, as Austrian business cycle theory predicts. 
 
In what regards economic policy, decision-makers are rather conservative in their thinking and still resort to 
Keynesian discretionary, fine-tuning policies, preaching more government spending, more debt and low 
intertemporal interest rates. Economists fail to analyze the real causes of the business cycle properly; consequently, 
they preserve the status quo, thus preventing liquidation of overinvestment and reallocation of productive resources 
at market prices. Despite heavy criticism of the current stabilization policies, particularly since the Asian crisis, 
international financial organizations together with national governments and regional/international institutions have 
continued the policy of bailing out countries and financial institutions. Providing more liquidity and allowing more 
credit expansion have become the rule, rather than the exception. But despite the declared intention to end the 
recession, market vulnerability is actually deepening (Davis 1995), as each new policy intervention sets the ground 
for the next crisis. Economists are not radical enough in formulating economic policy, because th
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the real cause of the problem, which makes their policy solutions useless, or even harmful. They act to expand credit 
even further, thus prolonging the real causes of the cycle. Although we are all aware that a financial panic did occur 
in National economies are 
perturbed by heavy state intervention that hampers free market coordination; therefore the cause of poor economic 
performance may lie in state interference, especially in the core sector of banking and finance. According to 
-wing 
parties, which have long warned of the dangers of unchecked marke
-regulation 
e on internal risk 
, 
endless cheap credit policies. Such examples show that economists have not learned much from past mistakes, and 
they are not investigating the causality of the business cycle, in order to end the recession. In marked contrast to 
orthodox neoclassical and Keynesian accounts of the business cycle, monetary business cycle models present a 
consistent and coherent explanation of the causes and propagation mechanisms of the business cycle. Though more 
typically qualitative than quantitative, the explanatory successes of these theories have proved their validity over a 
long period and range of specific applications. 
4. Conclusions 
The progress in business cycle research has been considerable, but it has had little impact on economic policies to 
stop recessions. At the theoretical level, monetary business cycles do provide a feasible explanation for the causation 
of the business cycle; as to the practical implications, monetary theories postulate that the best policy is the absence 
of economic policy. At the empirical level, we find that statistical data also support monetary business cycle 
mechanisms. As to economic policy measures, the mainstream view has approached a discretionary, fine-tuning 
policy, focused on fiscal activism. Despite the theoretical progress, economists have not substantially changed the 
way they formulate economic policy. Instead of holding on to outdated policy prescriptions, they should be more 
innovative in their thinking, address the causes of the business cycle and correlate them with the proposed remedies.  
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